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Abstract
This article introduces a suggested comprehensive framework for identifying, assessing and governing trade-offs and en-
hancing coherence in public policy decision-making. The framework is based on a simple three-stage model of policy-
making: understanding policy interactions (input), integrating policy-making (process), and assessing ex ante policy deci-
sions (output). The first stage is tackled with an interactions assessment framework, identifying how different sectors or
ministries relate to each other in terms of their respective objectives, and on what topics negotiations are required to
manage trade-offs. The second stage draws on approaches and experiences in environmental policy integration. It focuses
on institutional procedures, structures and rules that enable integrated policy-making processes. The third stage draws on
the longer-standing policy-analytical field of impact assessment applied to sustainable development. The article discusses
the conceptual and theoretical foundations of each stage, as well as practical policy experiences. Discussing this in the
context of 2030 Agenda implementation, the article suggests how trade-offs and policy coherence can be better governed
using adapted policy-analytic methods and approaches.
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1. Introduction
When the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
September 2015, it signified a new level of international
political agreement regarding the interdependency be-
tween economic and social development and environ-
mental sustainability. It is true that the Millennium
Development Goals included an environmental goal, and
that the earlier Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development articulated the three pillars of sustainable
development. What was new in 2015 was, first, that
the environmental, social, economic and institutional di-
mensions of development were so intertwined; for ex-
ample, the food security goal (Sustainable Development
Goal [SDG] 2) mainstreamed all three dimensions across
its targets. Second, the 2030 Agenda forcefully empha-
sized that the goals framework is “integrated and indivis-
ible” and that “the interlinkages and integrated nature of
the Sustainable Development Goals are of crucial impor-
tance” to its implementation (UN, 2015).
What exactly these interlinkages are differ in differ-
ent contexts, but they exist along several dimensions:
between economic, social and environmental interests;
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 254–263 254
between different sectoral interests; between domes-
tic and international objectives; and between short-and
long-term priorities (for empirical examples of trade-
offs pertaining to SDG implementation see e.g., Hutton
et al., 2018; Pradhan, Costa, Rybski, Lucht, & Kropp,
2017; Scherer et al., 2018). For national implementa-
tion this means that synergies and trade-offs between
targets that address different policy areas must be cap-
tured or reconciled at the domestic level, reconciled
with internationally agreed objectives, and any nega-
tive spillovers on other countries addressed (Nilsson,
Griggs, & Visbeck, 2016; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2018; Weitz,
Carlsen, Nilsson, & Skånberg, 2018).
Although dealing with trade-offs and promoting in-
tegrated policy-making have been long-standing agenda
items in public policy andmanagement, at least since the
1980s, the establishment of the 2030 Agenda—with its
wide scope and principles of universality, integration and
transformative change—marked a whole new level of
ambition. Progress on the SDGs requires cross-sectoral,
cross-scale and long-term policy approaches. However,
the international and national public policy agencies
mandated to deliver such integrated approaches have
struggled to do so in practice, and while enhancing
policy coherence is one of the targets of the 2030
Agenda, many countries have said that this is one of the
most difficult challenges in implementation (Koch, 2017;
OECD, 2018).
As any political declaration would, the 2030 Agenda
put focus on the positive interactions: The synergies and
co-benefits that can be harnessed when one develop-
ment achievement triggers or contributes to another. It
is noteworthy that most official public policy tends, for
political reasons, to avoid acknowledging trade-offs alto-
gether. At the global level, the 2030 Agenda makes refer-
ences to “win–win cooperation” but not to trade-offs or
conflicts between goals (UN, 2015). At the EU level, for
example, synergies between energy and climate policies,
as well as between different environmental policy objec-
tives, are often taken for granted, while underlying trade-
offs and goal conflicts are hidden from the discourse or ig-
nored. On the other hand, the realities of policy-making
have always beenmore about the other side of the “inte-
gration” coin: the many trade-offs and conflicts between
policy priorities in different areas. Managing these trade-
offs and conflicts, and finding paths to progress, are to a
great extent the heart of political decision-making.
This article aims to unpack the mechanisms available
for political decision-makers to manage trade-offs, from
the input stage of policy-making, through the process, to
ensuring that adopted public policies are as coherent as
possible. The purpose is to discuss available mechanisms
in the context of the 2030 Agenda, but it is not to pro-
vide an empirical study of how trade-offs are dealt with
in 2030 Agenda implementation. Our view is that such a
study would be premature and there is not yet enough
experience and data across jurisdictions.
Managing trade-offs in policy-making is not limited to
the novel field of 2030 Agenda implementation. In prac-
tice it has been a key part of the concept of policy coher-
ence for development pushed by theOECD formore than
a decade (OECD, 2018; OECD/Development Assistance
Committee, 2008). More “joined-up” government was
a top priority in the UK government in the 1990s, and
around that time also became an important agenda item
in the EU, which has since actively contributed to the
concept of policy coherence (Carbone, 2013; Ling, 2002).
In the EU, the impact assessment instrument became a
primary mechanism for identifying and mitigating trade-
offs when European directives are being prepared. But,
the 2030 Agenda establishes a new level of complexity,
a significant widening of the challenge of dealing with
trade-offs and expectations to establish a policy-making
system that can deliver coherent decisions.
In this article we connect this challenge to the ques-
tion of how best to organize decision-making in public
policy when it comes to complex problems. This field of
policy analysis and research has been occupied in par-
ticular with the question of how to foster participation
and engagement in, as well as technical expert input to,
the policy process, in order to make decisions both more
democratic and legitimate, and more effective in terms
of problem solving (Stern & Fineberg, 2003). It is a well-
established question in the policy sciences how to bal-
ance or combine these different processes and inputs,
through what has been called an “analytical-deliberative
process of decision making” (Renn, 1999). We postulate
that technical expertise is necessary but not sufficient
for dealing prudently with trade-offs in policy-making.
As part of pluralist societies, we must also account for
the diverse values, world views and legitimate interests
of different stakeholders. These will influence how is-
sues and knowledge are interpreted and used in politi-
cal processes.
The perspective taken here on policy coherence is
that the knowledge, entry points (e.g., ideological, cul-
tural) and information base available to decision-makers
is pertinent to governing trade-offs in a legitimate and ef-
fective way. In any representative political system, this is
what will be drawn on to motivate a decision—internally
as standpoints are negotiated within government, and
externally as government relates to the preference of
those who are affected by the decision and the actions
that follow.
Since the late 1990s there has been a push to en-
hance the scientific input to policy, making it more
evidence-based. Many barriers persist, on the supply as
well as the demand sides, including mismatched time-
lines, lack of consensus on research findings, failure to
communicate research in an understandable way, and
challenges to effectively engaging researchers in the pol-
icy process. Pragmatic approaches are needed that bal-
ance the requirements of policy-makers with the imper-
ative of scientific rigour, in order to address these barri-
ers and make the connection between science and pol-
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icy credible, relevant and legitimate (Gavine et al., 2018;
Sarkki et al., 2014). As GroHarlemBrundtland put it, “pol-
itics that disregard science and knowledge will not stand
the test of time” (Brundtland, 1997).
Another push has been for deepening participation
in political decision-making processes and institutions
that are genuinely deliberative (Pogrebinschi & Ryan,
2018). In practice this might make e.g., public hear-
ings, consultations, seminars and online portals for pub-
lic debate more common as a source of input to policy-
making. These institutions must also be representative
enough. This is important in relation to the 2030 Agenda,
given its emphasis on inclusiveness with regard both to
the adoption of the Agenda (which was the result of
over two years of public consultation; UN, 2015) and
to its guiding principles of “leaving no one behind” and
universality. It is also, more generally and normatively,
important in a world of increasing mistrust in public
institutions—although more research is needed into the
circumstances under which increased participation actu-
ally improves development outcomes and enhances the
legitimacy of and trust in decisions.
2. Approach
This article is only of limited empirical value, but instead
takes a policy-prescriptive approach to the governance
of trade-offs. As argued above, we take as a starting
point that governing trade-offs will require an analytic-
deliberative approach to policy-making, where both par-
ticipatory elements and technical expertise are required
at different stages.
In this, we use a policy-analytic model based on
simple input-process-output stage logic (Dunn, 2004).
In reality, the public policy process is far from linear,
and is a much more dynamic, chaotic and porous pro-
cess involving diverse actors, interests, ideas, institu-
tions and constantly perturbed by short-term disrup-
tions or shocks as well as changes in slower-moving vari-
ables. However, a more realistic representation of actual
policy-making—deploying, say, the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), new in-
stitutionalism (March & Olsen, 1983) or the policy
streams/garbage canmodel (Kingdon, 1984)—would risk
limiting the prescriptive value of the study, since the solu-
tions would be so strongly tied to a particular theoretical
lens on the process. We use this over-simplistic model in
order to provide clarity and focus on the solutions and
prescriptions offered.
The approach taken is to first identify the problem
in terms of trade-off governance in each stage, then to
describe the mechanisms available for decision-makers
to tackle this problem, and finally to describe how the
mechanisms have been applied in practice.
A comprehensive approach to achieve policy coher-
ence should start with a problem definition (Kurze &
Lenschow, 2018; Nilsson et al., 2012). Therefore, a map-
ping of interactions between different objectives forms
a necessary step at the input stage (Nilsson et al., 2016;
Weitz et al., 2018). The input stage involves the entry
points and knowledge base that goes into the policy-
making process, including the preunderstanding of the
societal context that actors in the policy-making have,
and the information that they can draw on to enhance
this understanding. An interactions assessment frame-
work helps to define the problem by allowing different
sectors or departments in government to come together
and jointly identify how they relate to each other in
terms of their respective priorities, and on what topics
negotiations are required to manage trade-offs.
The second process stage involves the procedures
and rules of decision-making that constitute the core
of the policy-making in the government offices. This is
for example features of the organizational set-up, stan-
dard operating procedures as well as additional mea-
sures taken to amplify or induce more integrated per-
spectives in the process. This stage is informed by adapt-
ing institutional lessons drawn from environmental pol-
icy integration.
The output stage involves the mechanisms available
for policy-makers, and other actors, to look ahead at
the resulting impacts, not only on the target policy do-
main but across all relevant domains, should the pol-
icy decisions be implemented. This stage is informed by
adapting different forms of impact assessment and fore-
sight methods.
Each of the three stages is discussed below in terms
of:
1. How the policy literature and policy applications
have dealt with the question of coherence and
trade-offs in that particular stage in recent years
or decades;
2. Inwhatways the 2030Agenda provides a new chal-
lenge and set of implications for the governance of
trade-offs in that particular stage;
3. Our outline of a potential approach to tackle this
new and reinforced challenge of governing trade-
offs in the era of the 2030 Agenda.
3. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in
Policy Inputs
A basic principle for governance to be effective in
achieving the intended results of the 2030 Agenda is
that public policies should be “coherent with one an-
other and founded on true or well-established grounds”
(UN Economic and Social Council & Center for European
Policy Analysis, 2018). Without a solid knowledge base
that considers how different objectives or sectors in-
teract, policies risk continuing to reinforce unsustain-
able patterns of interaction. The 2030 Agenda is meant
to break such patterns. For example, achieving both
SDG 8 and SDG 15 (and several other goals that inter-
act with them) requires decoupling economic growth
from environmental degradation. While these interac-
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tions existed before the UN member states agreed on
the 2030 Agenda, the declaration marks an elevated am-
bition to clarify them at global, national and sub-national
levels and for policy and actions to respond to them.
As stated in paragraph 18 of the declaration, “never be-
fore have world leaders pledged common action and
endeavour across such a broad and universal policy
agenda” (UN, 2015). Attaining the SDGs will largely de-
pend on whether policy can tackle trade-offs and lever-
age synergies within this broad agenda (Pradhan et al.,
2017). For the input stage of policy-making this implies
a need for approaches that can single out actionable
information among complex interdependencies within
and between economical, political, social and technolog-
ical systems.
While the need for policy integration and coherence
has been recognized for decades, progress in practice
has been limited. One reason is a technocratic approach
assuming that once information on cross-sectoral inter-
actions is available, policy can swiftly be adjusted to
resolve or optimize them. The academic literature re-
lated to policy coherence and integration, however, sug-
gests that political and cognitive factors such as trust,
ownership and learning are essential in order for in-
puts on policy interactions to make a difference in ac-
tual decision-making (Weitz, Strambo, Kemp-Benedict, &
Nilsson, 2017). Decision-makers’ understanding of rela-
tions and interactions shapes their views on what chal-
lenges andopportunities trade-offs and co-benefits pose,
and what policy options there are for mitigating or cap-
turing them. Policies thus result from a weighting of dif-
ferent options that are derived from institutions’ value
systems and the perceptions of decision-makers (Nilsson,
2005; Persson, 2007). Tackling trade-offs from the input
stage is largely about working with these perceptions
and understandings. With policy changes following from
changes to the way decision-makers understand and per-
ceive of different phenomena, strengthening the infor-
mation basis and knowledge about interactions at the in-
put stage becomes crucial for policy to more effectively
govern trade-offs.
Information about policy interactions is often scat-
tered and fragmented, and views on their implications
diverge (Bosch, King, Herbohn, Russell, & Smith, 2007).
In the context of the 2030 Agenda this is particularly
challenging given the large number of interacting tar-
gets and their often complex relationships. The Delphi
method is one of the most frequently used by decision-
makers to aggregate large amounts of information and
support consensus. It emerged in the 1950s and is used
in foresight exercises to generate scenarios (Bañuls &
Turoff, 2011), which is a widely used tool in long-term
planning (Weimer-Jehle, 2006). Though systematic and
interactive, the Delphi method in its original form does
not account for how the different events that comprise
a scenario influence each other, and it therefore does
not provide decision-makers with the systemic thinking
needed to support policy coherence.
In the context of the 2030 Agenda, systemic think-
ing means taking a holistic view to explore how all the
targets work together and what the emergent effects
of their interaction are, and understanding what this
means for goal attainment in different geographies and
for different groups of people. As an approach, Systems
Thinking has shifted its focus since it first emerged in
the 1950s, away from goal seeking and towards learn-
ing (Bañuls & Turoff, 2011). Reflecting this, Quade (1969)
concluded, in the context of future studies, that a sys-
temic approach is useful to governments if it is integrated
into the policy-making process. Such integration would
facilitate proper consideration of results and the learn-
ing needed for policy change to happen.
Cross-impact analysis emerged in response to the
lack of systemic thinking in future studies—and the
Delphi method in particular. Exploring whether the oc-
currence of an event changes the probability of other
events occurring, it sought to reduce uncertainty about
the future by analysing multidisciplinary interactions
(Gordon & Hayward, 1968). Given the complex environ-
ments that decision-makers face—multiple objectives,
long time horizons, a large number of diverse impacted
groups, and risk and uncertainty, to name just a few—
cross-impact analysis is not intended to identify “optimal
solutions,” just to generate insights that help decision-
makers reach better decisions (Keeney, 1982).
The first step in cross-impact analysis is to define the
events (variables) to be included. For the 2030 Agenda
this would be the SDGs or a subset of their 169 targets. In
the next step, the interactions between these events are
assessed. In the original formof cross-impact analysis the
assessment was focused on the probability of each event
occurring under the influence of all the other events, or
checking the coherence of such probability assessments.
Today, many variants of cross-impact analysis exist and it
belongs to a whole family of methods for analysing and
modeling systems that sit between empirical data-driven
computationalmodels and argumentative systems analy-
sis (Mariconda & Lurati, 2015; Panula-Ontto et al., 2018).
The exact question in focus has been modified to meet
different needs and not all cross-impact analyses use a
probabilistic approach (Weimer-Jehle, 2006).
With our perspective on policy coherence, a key
strength of cross-impact analysis in the context of 2030
Agenda implementation is how it pragmatically strikes
a balance between argumentative/verbal analysis that
is important for the cognitive aspects of policy change,
and computational support that allows for assessment
of multiple interactions that would be too complex for
most human minds (Panula-Ontto et al., 2018; Weimer-
Jehle, 2006). Commonly, a group of experts represent-
ing the different sectors of the included events estimate
the interactions in the assessment (Gordon, 1994).While
these experts can focus on just parts of the system and
on its conceptual and argumentative foundations, their
input provides all the data needed for calculating dynam-
ics of the system that may not be obvious at first. This
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way it effectively breaks down system aspects in a way
that avoids decision-makers being overwhelmed by com-
plexity and yet goes far in terms of systemic analysis
(Panula-Ontto et al., 2018).
By generating a level of consensus among decision-
makers on complex policy questions, while also moving
beyond argumentative analysis in a decision situation
where empirical data is lacking and quantification diffi-
cult (Panula-Ontto et al., 2018), the approach is valuable
in the input stage of policy-making for 2030 Agenda im-
plementation where there is no scientific consensus on
how targets interact in a particular context and several
targets still lack appropriate indicators.
One example of applying cross-impact analysis to
2030 Agenda implementation (see Weitz et al., 2018)
combines a qualitative interactions assessment facili-
tated through cross-sectoral dialogues and quantitative
network analysis in order to single out the most impor-
tant information for strategic decision-making with re-
gard to target interactions and achieving the SDGs. This
includes identification of critical trade-offs and synergies
in progress towards the different SDG targets, how they
interact and what are leverage points for progressing on
the whole set of targets. Based on this, policy can focus
on those leverage points that create synergies, and on
mitigating the trade-offs. The cross-sectoral dialogues in-
volving experts frome.g., differentministries, specialized
agencies, government coordination bodies and interest
groups, are central to the approach and bring value in
terms of the cognitive factors of policy change discussed
earlier, including influencing the knowledge and percep-
tion of decision-makers. For example, the approach pro-
vides structure and a common language about interac-
tions that can support a collective understanding about
how they can be understood conceptually and what
they imply in a specific context. This can help to facili-
tate greater understanding for the perspectives of other
stakeholders, build consensus, and strengthen accep-
tance and ownership of policy outputs and outcomes.
Systems thinking and cross-impact analysis have the
potential to strengthen the input stage of policy-making
in a way that is needed to respond to the reinforced
challenge of governing trade-offs in the era of the 2030
Agenda—both in terms of improving the information
base but also in equipping policy-makers with the under-
standing, knowledge and social relations that can pave
the way for better governance of trade-offs throughout
all stages of policy-making.
4. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in
the Policy Process
Moving to the treatment of trade-offs in the process
stage of policy-making, ensuring more integrated policy
processes has been a recurring theme, in particular in
European policy-making, since at least the late 1980s.
With provisions made in the treaties of Amsterdam
(1997) and of Maastricht (1992), it is fair to say that “in-
tegrated policy-making” even has constitutional backing
in the EU. The motivation was the insight that environ-
mental problems can only be effectively addressed by
the sectors that drive and cause them. The process of
ensuring such integration then became complicated be-
cause those sectors, such as energy, industry and agri-
culture, are not causing environmental damages for the
hell of it, but because they usually consider it a trade-
off worth tolerating—in the name of e.g., productivity,
competitiveness, growth or jobs. The inevitable backlash
was then that the pursuit of integration in order to bet-
ter deal with those trade-offs could lead to dilution of
environmental objectives instead of sectors taking own-
ership and integrating them into their strategic orienta-
tions (Nilsson & Persson, 2003)
It is possible to distinguish between two different
ambition levels—one which seeks coherence in terms
of merely avoiding trade-offs, or in other words ensur-
ing policy consistency (Den Hertog & Stroß, 2011); and
a more ambitious level which looks for policy coherence
that allows synergistic solutions that drive towards com-
mon objectives across different policy domains. In an ear-
lier branch of policy-analytic literature, on policy coordi-
nation, this differentiation was also known as negative
coordination vs positive coordination (Scharpf, 1994).
Different perspectives—and associated integration
strategies—can be applied. The political perspective
characterizes a political system predominantly in terms
of conflict, competition for resources, and struggles be-
tween different interest groups, andwhereby political ac-
tors mediate by taking into account lobbying input from
different sectors and interests. With a political perspec-
tive, coherence and integration require interventions
into the incentives and power balances between actors
in the system.
The institutional perspective characterizes policy-
making as a governance machinery that contains
separated entities (“siloes”), and that organizational
instruments, procedural arrangements and institu-
tional reforms can be applied towards increasing the
connectivity—at both strategic and operational levels
of government.
The cognitive perspective characterizes policy-
making processes as being embedded in cognitive
“frames,” i.e., cognitive structures or sets of ideas about
how the world works, which structure thinking in the
processes. The presence of alternative frames in differ-
ent sectors which compete with each other is indeed a
powerful part of the political science understanding of
policy-making (Schön & Rein, 1994). With the cognitive
perspective, integration and coherence efforts turn to
strategies to connect different frames and to promote
learning and evolution of them, either through sudden
or gradual external shocks, or through accumulation of
evidence and knowledge pertinent to the issue at hand
(Nilsson, 2005)
In reality, instruments for enhancing integration in
the process have been tested, building on all three
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 254–263 258
perspectives, and government bureaucracies now have
more than two decades of experience in terms of
such efforts. They entail things like national plans and
strategies (such as policy coherence for development);
obligations to develop strategies and report on cross-
cutting priorities and mainstreaming; internal think-tank
functions within central government; amalgamation of
government ministries; coherence units at the “cen-
tre of government” (the Office of the Prime Minister
or President); and interdepartmental working groups
(Jacob & Volkery, 2004).
While these types of institutional fix can have some
positive effect, ultimately, dealing with trade-offs be-
tween sectors remains a fundamentally political process
which requires negotiation among actors with different
goals. Such negotiations often lead to biased or unex-
pected results due to unequal distribution of power,
voice, access to information, and resources and capacities
between different actors (Perrone & Hornberger, 2014).
In the era of the 2030 Agenda, the coherence and
trade-off challenge in the process stage takes on a new
form. Lessons from institutional arrangements amenable
to promoting environmental policy integration appear
relevant also for governing trade-offs in the 2030Agenda,
bearing in mind that the challenge is not to manage
trade-offs between two policy sectors, but to treat prior-
ities within all policy sectors as an “indivisible whole.” As
the processmoves from sectoral departments to the cen-
tre of government, it is necessary to gain a comprehen-
sive view. However, “breaking down the silos,” a slogan
often invoked in the 2030 Agenda discourse, is likely a
dangerous strategy. As argued in the input stage section
above, sectoral expertise is necessary to build coherent
policies (Nilsson & Persson, 2017).
What are required instead are institutional reforms
that enhance foresight, communication and collabora-
tion across departments. The process likely requires over-
sight and ownership at the centre of government, but
also mobilization and leadership from those ministries
that have traditionally been most powerful, such as the
Ministry for Finance (Nilsson & Persson, 2017).
Existing ways to deal with trade-offs have become in-
stitutionalized through different, and often quite effec-
tive, policy mechanisms. Impetus to change these mech-
anismswill tend tomeet resistance. This is not only about
not wanting to change; more systemic focus on coher-
ence and trade-offs comes at a cost, since more fully co-
herent approaches (Nilsson & Persson, 2017):
• Can be difficult to sell to the public and to media,
as they tend to have longer payback cycles (that do
not resonate well with political, including election,
cycles);
• Can be at odds with internal accountability and
performance evaluation systems;
• Can be at odds with bureaucratic routines and
standard operating procedures.
However, it is worth noting that while reforming gov-
ernment processes might face several barriers, another
driver for integrationmight come from the outsideworld.
Indeed, the 2030 Agenda explicitly expects actors out-
side government, including the private sector and civil so-
ciety, to engage in its implementation. Early experiences
with the internalization of the agenda into the private
sector suggest that it is met with far more interest and
commitment than, for example, previous specific envi-
ronmental and social protection agendas. Previously de-
fensive industries are becoming much more proactive
and are buying in to the 2030 Agenda at a strategic level.
Thus, policy integration will get additional drive from a
multi-stakeholder engagement approach where govern-
ment officials engage more with societal stakeholders,
in terms of both designing implementation instruments
and following up on progress and results.
Concrete mechanisms for policy consultation have
been in place for decades. What would be required is
a more ambitious deliberative process which covers a
wider set of policy issues, including problem identifica-
tion, objective setting, development of options, and eval-
uation of those options in terms of impacts on and con-
sequences for different policy priorities.
5. Addressing Trade-Offs and Building Coherence in
Policy Outputs
While there is value in process, what matters ultimately
is the coherence of the generated policy outputs, and ul-
timately the outcomes: changes in the behaviour, prac-
tices and choices of different actors in society. Ensuring
more coherent outputs requires some form of standard
that can inform or induce the design of policies so that
trade-offs can be identified, addressed, and mitigated as
far as possible. The most established and institutional-
ized form for this is impact assessment, which since the
1970s has become a significant field of professional prac-
tice as well as of research (Fischer & Montaño, 2019).
Most governments have, at least on article, some
form of mandatory impact assessment approach.
Commonly, these impact assessments concern the pre-
diction of economic, social and environmental conse-
quences of draft policy proposals, either economy-wide
or in specific sectors. In some places, the focus is on
the impacts in terms of regulatory burden (so-called
Regulatory Impact Assessment; Hertin, Jacob, Pesch, &
Pacchi, 2009); in others there is a stronger focus on envi-
ronmental and/or social impacts (Environmental Impact
Assessment; Social Impact Assessment; Becker, 2001).
Different forms of impact assessment use different
methods. These methods have critical limitations and
may overlook important dimensions or interactions, in
particular when looking beyond the short term. Issues
that tend to be neglected include dynamic or structural
effects, the existence of thresholds, non-linear effects,
or irreversible changes (Lade, Tavoni, Levin, & Schlüter,
2013). Furthermore, issues that are difficult to quantify
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or model (e.g., quality of education, or empowerment of
women) tend to be neglected. As Peter Drucker put it,
“what gets measured gets managed” (Drucker, 1954).
The practices of impact assessment fundamentally
differ between different communities and jurisdictions
(Pope, Bond, Morrison-Saunders, & Retief, 2013). In
some jurisdictions, such as with the EU, impact as-
sessments used by the European Commission are
mostly model-based technical studies. In others, such
as Sweden, qualitative assessments and reasoning domi-
nate. Ambitious efforts to include stakeholders in the as-
sessment process through deliberativemethods are rare.
The theory and practice of impact assessment has,
despite many years of development, not strengthened
its role as an instrument for governing policy coherence.
The 2030 Agenda presents an opportunity to revamp
it. By making the 2030 Agenda the starting point for
impact assessments, governments can achieve a frame-
work with strong international legitimacy and relatively
comprehensive coverage of societal priorities in a sys-
tematic way.
In a revamped impact assessment framework, the
17 SDGs can form key impact categories, but they will
need to be both condensed and interpreted in the con-
text of the proposed policy intervention. The interpreta-
tion also depends on the political priorities and agendas
in the jurisdiction in question. For the EU context, for ex-
ample, we suggest the following parameters could be rel-
evant under each SDG (depending ultimately on the pol-
icy intervention):
SDG 1—Impact on incomes of low-income and vul-
nerable groups;
SDG 2—Impacts on food security (national or local
supply chains), on nutrition, and on environmental sus-
tainability of agriculture;
SDG 3—Impacts on disease prevalence, and on
lifestyles through changes in access to physical activity
or nutrition;
SDG 4—Impact on school performance;
SDG 5—Impacts on equal opportunities and on equal
treatment of men and women;
SDG 6—Impact on water quality and quantity;
SDG 7—Impacts on energy consumption and on se-
curity of supply;
SDG 8—Impacts on employment, on economic
growth and on competitiveness;
SDG 9—Impacts on industry, on small and medium-
sized enterprises, and on regulatory burden;
SDG 10—Impact on distribution of income and social
equality, including regional effects;
SDG 11—Impacts on urban quality of life, inclusion,
segregation and safety;
SDG 12—Impacts on natural resource use, on emis-
sions of pollution, and on chemicals use;
SDG 13—Impacts on climate resilience and on green-
house gas emissions;
SDG 14—Impacts on pollution of oceans and on
ocean resources;
SDG 15—Impacts on biodiversity and on functioning
of ecosystems;
SDG 16—Impacts on criminal activity, on local gover-
nance systems, and on inclusion of citizens in decision-
making;
SDG 17—Impacts on developing countries and on in-
ternational trade.
Clearly, many of these aspects are already treated
today in existing frameworks. However, applying such a
new SDG-based impact assessment framework will re-
quire development of methods. In many OECD countries,
data will be available for a baseline, but the analytical
toolbox to simulate impacts across all fields is not yet suf-
ficient. For example, despite decades of effort in build-
ing comprehensive simulation and assessment models,
we are largely unable to predict patterns of systemic
change in society in areas such as climate mitigation pol-
icy (Pindyck, 2013).
There are international efforts to develop new meth-
ods and approaches in integrated assessment that can
provide a more coherent or comprehensive view of de-
velopment trajectories across the SDGs. Themodels that
exist are highly complex and suffer from not having res-
olution at national scale. Another common problem is a
lack of transparency which limits the possibility for the
users of the result to interpret what the models sug-
gest. Finally, there is deep scientific uncertainty about
the systems studied, although progress is being made
continuously (Weyant, 2017). Thus, we conclude that the
state-of-the-art is such that the integrated assessment
models will not be usable as impact-assessment tools
for more coherent policy-making at national level in the
near term.
Given that setting benchmarks is a highly complex
and uncertain—and politicized—process, and that as-
sumptions and projections into the future about impact
chains add to the uncertainty, it must be recognized that
impact assessment is fraught with challenges. The ac-
tual outcome of any implemented policy instrument can
never be known with any degree of certainty. In real-
ity, policy-making to manage trade-offs is not a one-off
event, but rather a sequential decision-making process
under deep uncertainty (Weyant, 2008). Assumptions
need to be made regarding the way in which the policy
will operate and what impacts it will have on behavior
under different conditions within the larger political, eco-
nomic and social context; how it will interact with other
policies through causal relations; or the ways in which
it will be adopted and implemented by different actors.
Furthermore, its rationalistic assumptions about actors’
responses to a policy change often run counter to the po-
litical realities.
It is not feasible to generate quantitative impact pre-
dictions for all 17 SDGs, much less for all 169 targets,
in a policy impact assessment. However, it is possible
to establish an impact assessment framework which en-
ables qualitative assessments along all 17 dimensions.
To a great degree, that assessment can draw on the in-
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teractions assessment that was carried out in the input
stage. It can also benefit greatly from continuing the
deliberative input with multiple stakeholder within and
outside government who contribute to the assessment.
When deemed relevant and critical (as a result of identi-
fying hotspots or because it is a political priority), deeper
quantitative analysis, including with specific modelling
or with statistical evidence, can be carried out for spe-
cific impacts.
6. Conclusions
This article suggests that lessons on and approaches to
more coherent policy-making and policy analysis can be
deployed to deal more effectively with trade-offs in polit-
ical life. The mechanisms that they provide are useful at
the input, process and output stage of the policy process.
The 2030 Agenda does not fundamentally change the dy-
namic of trade-offs in politics, but with its broad scope,
numerous interactions, and guiding principles of univer-
sality, integration and transformative change, it presents
far greater challenges than past development agendas.
It should prompt policy-makers and analysts to sharpen
their tools, and generates demand for a more stringent
and systematic approach and “governance infrastruc-
ture” that can address trade-offs, running through the
entire policy process.
We have discussed the treatment of trade-offs in the
input, process and output stages of policy-making. In
the process and output stages, policy integration mech-
anisms and impact assessment mechanisms have been
tested, used and abused by decision-makers for decades,
whereas the proposed interactions assessment in the in-
put stage is more unexplored territory. We see this as
a critical addition, one which not only generates much-
needed knowledge for policy-makers around the char-
acter of trade-offs that will need managing, but also
paves the way for more effective approaches in the lat-
ter two stages.
An analytical-deliberative approach appears not only
useful but essential in order to manage trade-offs and
build coherence. It is not only that a broad range of stake-
holders have a legitimate claim to be given a voice, and
that involving them will generate better decisions, but
also it reflects the fundamental premise that there is
no single true, objective understanding of a policy prob-
lem that can be discovered through analytical work. Even
with the greatest scientific rigour applied, the results of
analytical work will inevitably reflect the biases of the
participating bodies (Kurze & Lenschow, 2018).
This is, therefore, our final message: Managing pol-
icy trade-offs cannot be done solely through science and
technical expertise; to facilitate policy change, stakehold-
ers must drive the input of knowledge, perspectives and
values at all of the three stages of policy formation. This
alsomeansmaking themost of existing knowledge in the
current political context and institutional landscape.
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